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What Does Mathematics Understanding Look Like? 
Judith Mousley 
Deakin University 
<judith mousley@deakin edu au> 
The concept of mathematical understanding is central to curriculum development, 
classroom interaction, and the training of mathematics teachers  In this paper, some models 
of the growth of understanding that the literature presents are outlined  Some results of a 
study that documented four primary teachers’ mental models of, and beliefs about, different 
forms of understanding are reported  It is proposed that linear models may restrict ways that 
these teachers plan lessons  Questions for further research are raised  
If you were asked to provide a metaphor for the development of understanding, how 
would you describe it? How does your model fit with your practices of curriculum 
planning or teaching and assessment of your own students? I wonder how many readers of 
this paper have considered such questions or discuss them with student teachers   
There is widespread rhetoric about the development of “mathematical understanding”, 
and many teachers, teacher educators, and curriculum documents stress that it is vital to 
develop it  However, despite the fact that the meanings that people hold for the term 
mathematical understanding help shape teaching and teacher education, the varied 
meanings are rarely articulated  This paper is an attempt to stimulate mathematics 
educators at all levels to address this anomaly  
Given the complexity of understanding itself, any model or metaphor is bound to be 
inadequate (Pirie, 1988)  However, it is useful to reflect on what people might mean when 
they use the term “mathematical understanding” as they expound its importance as an 
objective of school education  One way to do this is to examine the models portrayed in 
mathematics education literature and to see if such models are also held by teachers  In this 
paper, four teachers’ mental models of mathematical understanding are described and 
tentative suggestions about how these may constrain planning and teaching are made  
Models of Mathematical Understanding 
The following summary of metaphors for mathematics understanding used by 
researchers is organised into three general categories: understanding as structured progress, 
understanding as forms of knowing, and understanding as process  These are not the only 
way to group models of understanding but were “emergent categories” (after Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985) during a literature search in preparation for case studies of what teachers 
believe about mathematical understanding and what they do to develop it   
This paper focuses mainly on models that were initiated in the 1960s—a period when 
how to develop students’ understanding was a key focus of mathematics education 
research—with a resurgence of activity late in the 1980s  In each category below, 
representative models are presented  (See Mousley, 2003, for a fuller exposition ) 
Understanding as Structured Progress 
My first group of models depicts the development of understanding as structural 
progression  Use of “construction” models to describe the development of understanding 
followed a trend in sociology, but in mathematics education the notion was grounded 
mainly in psychology  Terms such as “constructivism” clearly suggest a building process, 
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but right from early development of such a notion, the idea of building from foundational 
understandings to higher levels of knowledge has not been as predictable as the metaphor 
suggests  The process of fitting new knowledge with old has been portrayed as an active 
and interactive one  For instance, Piaget described the development of understanding as a 
growing awareness of relationships, as inner experimentation, and as the internalisation of 
possible courses of action with specific purposes in mind—all activities involving sensory-
motor activity aimed at the construction of objects (Piaget, 1950)  Developing 
understanding involved increasing ability to hold several relationships in mind, permitting 
further abstraction and anticipation (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964)   
Later, von Glasersfeld  (1987) built on this work, portraying understanding as an 
organisational process and emphasising that cognitive activity is aimed at bringing about 
consistency: 
The experiencing organism now turns into a builder of cognitive structures, intending to solve such 
problems as the organism perceives or conceives … among which is the never ending problem of 
consistent organizations (of such structures) that we call understanding  (p  7)  
Sinclair (1987) also drew on Piaget’s structural metaphor, noting that understanding of a 
mathematical concept is laboriously constructed over time  He described how particular 
understandings serve as springboards for further learning, enabling progressive 
understanding to be built  However, he noted that some understanding becomes 
backgrounded because there is a moment when a realisation becomes obvious, and the 
mind is released for other things  The learner finds it hard to believe that there had been a 
time when a new idea was not present in the mind, so it can be difficult to go back to first 
principles  Hence both children and inexpert teachers may find it difficult to explain the 
logical construction sequence that they themselves have used  
This period also saw the emergence of Soviet psychology’s model of developmental 
“zones” in western mathematics education theorising  The contention is that teachers need 
to create learning situations that demand thinking, skills, and knowledge development that 
are just ahead their students’ current zones of understanding  Coming to grips with a 
concept sets up potential for movement into a further zone of development (e g  Vygotsky, 
1978)   
Understanding as Forms of Knowing 
Other researchers contrasted different forms of understanding  An early example of this 
is Maslow (1966), who identified two different types of understanding  The first was 
“scientific”, where rational thought is reduced to lawful explanation  The second was 
“suchness” understanding, which depends on contextual and qualitative experience, 
developing knowledge that can be referred beyond direct experience  
Skemp (1976) acknowledged the work of Maslow and discussed his concept with 
Mellin-Olsen  Skemp characterised two forms of understanding as different forms of 
knowing, claiming that these lead to two distinct kinds of mathematics  He originally 
termed the two types of understanding “relational” and “instrumental”  The former referred 
to the “building up a conceptual structure … from which its possessor can … produce an 
unlimited number of plans for getting from any starting point within his schema to any 
finishing point” (p  23)  The latter involved learning by rote, but Skemp noted that, “for 
many pupils and their teachers the possession of … a rule, and ability to use it, was what 
they meant by ‘understanding’” (p  20)  He later identified two further forms of 
understanding: “logical” and “symbolic” (see Skemp, 1982)  
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Herscovics and Bergeron (1983) participated in debates of this time, later 
distinguishing four levels of understanding  “Intuition” involves global perceptual 
awareness  “Procedural” understanding involves a realisation of possibilities for 
transformation  “Logico-physical” abstraction involves coming aware of physical 
invariants, of structure  “Formalisation” involves generalisation to the use of mathematical 
procedures, realisation of possibilities for transfer to new contexts, and abstraction to the 
notational system  However, they warned against thinking of these as sequential, noting 
that the child evolves simultaneously at different levels  Gray and Tall (1994) suggested 
that such types of understanding are not easily placed on a linear framework because they 
interact  They claimed that combinations of categories are needed to describe certain forms 
of cognitive development, particular understandings, behaviours, or outcomes of children’s 
work  Tall (1992) later suggested that a lattice should be used, with “concrete”, “iconic”, 
and “symbolic” forms of understanding laced against “relational”, “instrumental” and 
“logical” forms  
Sierpinska (1994) further modelled the process of mathematical understanding as a 
lattice, claiming that acts of understanding (e g  explanations, validations) are interwoven 
with knowledge of particular situations (e g  concepts, theories and problems)  She 
distinguished between “acts of understanding” and “an understanding”, with the latter 
being the potential to experience an act of understanding when necessary in specific 
contexts  She distilled four categorisations of acts of understanding: “identification”, 
“discrimination”, “generalisation”, and “synthesis”   
Some researchers have categorised different forms of knowing hierarchically  For 
example, van Heile and van Hiele-Geldof (1958) observed three forms of insight—pupils’ 
understanding of what they are doing, of why they are doing it, and of when to do it  They 
constructed a teaching sequence that can be used to move the students from very direct 
instruction to independent understanding, through “inquiry”, “directed orientation”, 
“explicating”, and “explanation”, to “free orientation” and finally “integration”  Such work 
laid conceptual foundations for later hierarchical models such as the SOLO taxonomy (see, 
for example, Biggs & Collis, 1982)  
Understanding as Process 
Wittgenstein (1967) presented understanding as socio-linguistic activity  He saw 
crucial connections between understanding and enculturation, claiming that people develop 
mathematical meaning through diverse “language games”, where understanding depends 
on knowledge of conventional agreements  He equated understanding with operating, 
acknowledging that a multiplicity of understandings relate to different types of operations   
Pirie and Kieren (1989) also presented a grounded model  They questioned the idea of 
categorising understanding because they believe that there is no such thing as 
understanding in the abstract  For these researchers, mathematical understanding is 
described as “a process, grounded within a person, within a topic, within a particular 
environment” (p  39)  They argued that understanding is a “whole, dynamic, levelled but 
non-linear, transcendentally recursive process” (Kieren & Pirie, 1991, p  78), “a continuing 
process of organising one’s knowledge structures” (Pirie & Kieren, 1994, p  166)  In this 
body of writing, Pirie and Kieren modelled mathematical understanding as a recursive 
phenomenon with thinking moving between levels of sophistication, each contained within 
succeeding levels  Even when new concepts no longer draw on previous understandings, 
Pirie and Kieren identified a process of “folding back” to recapture what they call “inner-




In this paper I report on just a small part of case study research on teachers’ views of 
“mathematical understanding”, ways they think they develop it, and what they do in 
mathematics lessons to this end  My focus here is on the results when four teachers who 
were asked to describe their own models of understanding   
About 4 weeks were being spent in each of 4 classrooms in a rural school  “David” and 
“Jan” were the teachers of the two Year 6 classes  “Tracey” and “Robyn” taught the Year 2 
classes  All of these teachers were experienced practitioners, well respected by their 
colleagues as well as their students  Each teacher was interviewed several times, and their 
mathematics lessons were videotaped  The resulting audiotaped and videotaped data were 
analysed in order to find examples of what the teachers believed and did in relation to the 
development of their pupils’ mathematical understanding  The full report of this research 
(Mousley, 2003) is descriptive, with close reference to multimedia appendices  
During interviews, these teachers were asked two questions relevant to the topic of this 
paper: (a) “If you were asked to describe children’s development of mathematical 
understanding, what model would you use—maybe a metaphor or a picture that you 
imagine?” and (b) “Do you think there are different types of understanding?” 
Metaphors for Understanding 
When first asked about their images of mathematical understanding, three of the 
teachers described a spiral  While Jan and Tracey described a simple linear model, Jan 
articulated this more clearly:  
 
Jan:  We use a spiral curriculum   
Interviewer: What do you mean when you say that? 
Jan:  They learn to understand a series of things, and in the next grade they re-visit them and 
build on them  It’s a spiral, going up and up   
Interviewer: Is that just your image? You said “We”   
Jan:  It’s “we”  It’s a term we use often, and we plan that way  It’s the way that the school 
curriculum is set out  
Interviewer: Is the CSF [curriculum document] structured that way? 
Jan:  Mainly  It builds on each year, revising the topics  Like groups, multiplying 2 numbers, 
then double digit by one, then long multiplication  It keeps coming round  
Interviewer: Do you imagine a single line? 
Jan:  I have not thought … probably … yes, I do  It has to be because they are only learning 
one thing at a time  
Interviewer: So is their understanding itself a single line—or the things they understand? 
Jan:  I am not sure what you mean  (Paused) Understanding is the things they understand  I 
see what you mean—like understanding itself  No, they are the same  They 
understanding a series of things so that is their understanding  
 
Robyn described a detailed picture of a spiral of concepts and processes: 
 
Robyn:  I could not picture anything yesterday, but I thought about it  It’s like building blocks, 
where you stack one top of the other  Not a straight line, (but) like a spiral because 
somehow ideas get repeated at the higher level, round and up  (I asked for an example ) 
I mean, they have to understand addition, not just be able to do it but to understand it 
before they can manage the next block, subtraction, but they also have to understand 
the addition when they do adding decimals later, and especially adding time—when it 
is not base ten  So it’s a stack of blocks, but you build on any idea revisiting it year 
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after year  It’s colorful, really, and I think of it with colors, like red blocks for addition 
keep appearing above each other in the spiral  
Interviewer: That sounds colorful  So it’s blocks, building blocks? Are they blocks of 
understanding? 
Robyn: Yes, well blocks of things they can explain because they understand them  
Interviewer: So they’re concepts—maths ideas? 
Robyn: Yes, and the processes, and time, and measurements, and fractions, and so on  All they 
learn  Things they can explain, ones they understand   
 
David also used the spiral metaphor, but pictured more complexity: 
 
David:  … like a helix  You know, DNA  It’s got lots of elements all connected at any level, 
but the levels develop in a long spiral  
Interviewer: So is a level a grade level? 
David:  Perhaps, but not usually  I think of them as smaller, much small, quite small; like 
decimals and percentages are linked on the same level, and next week they come 
together in money problems and that’s all on one level  
Interviewer: So it’s quite a complex spiral—made of lots of linked ideas (David nodded ) More like 
a network? 
David:  Yes, but in a spiral  Do you know what I mean when I say a spiral curriculum? 
 
Clearly the term “spiral curriculum” had influenced these teachers’ perceptions of both 
teaching and learning in mathematics classrooms  It is interesting that it was not used in 
any subject areas, and that the teachers were surprised when I pointed this out  
Tracey:  You are right  Yes  We don’t have it  Well, we do sometimes  I can think of learning 
ball skills and athletics and things in phys ed, but you are right, we don’t say that—
spiral curriculum  In maths it is obvious though because that is the way you teach it  
 
There are 3 particularly interesting commonalities in what these teachers said about 
their images of spirals  First, the teachers all described understanding as what is to be 
understood—in Robyn’s words “things they can explain”—rather than a form of activity or 
an abstract notion in its own right   
Second, their structural models fit with the term “constructivism” that was commonly 
used by them: e g , “We are constructivist teachers, mainly” (David)  However, the 
metaphor portrayed a sense of teacher-designed sequences of new ideas and skills rather 
than the mental activity that authors such as Piaget and von Glasersfeld portrayed  When I 
realised this I understood better the teachers’ surprise at their own initial inability to talk 
about what they thought mathematical understanding is, because while one does not 
describe “understanding” as syllabus content, such content comprised the elements of the 
models they described in later interviews  All four commented that they had used the term 
“mathematical understanding” many times, and believed that they taught “for 
understanding” but had not previously considered the phenomenon itself   
Third, and more important, is the fact that the term “spiral curriculum”, used in the 
school only in relation to mathematics content, seemed to have become unproblematic  
These teachers did not question the notion of the mathematics curriculum being fairly 
linear yet relatively repetitious from year to year  This assumption influenced their 
planning and teaching as well as their expectations for student performance and future 
learning  For example, when asked about a grade 6 girl who obviously had not understood 
what had just been taught in a lesson on multiplication, Jan declared, “… ideally she would 
know it all now, but we just have to accept the idea that she will need to come back to this 
work next year—and perhaps for several years”   
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Different Types of Understanding 
When asked whether he knew about any different types of understanding, David 
responded immediately: 
 
David You mean, like abstract and concrete? … a lot of discussion that I had with [a Science 
lecturer] was about that   
Interviewee: What about any other types of understanding? 
David There was an article in Common Denominator a couple of months ago, about some 
others  Relational was one  I can’t remember the others, but it struck me that it’s 
important, relational I mean, understanding the connections between ideas  
 
Jan also mentioned “abstract” and “concrete” understanding several times during our 
discussions, without prompting  When I asked her if there seem to be different types of 
understanding, she asked me what I meant  I suggested that she already knew about 
abstract and concrete understanding, and she said, “That covers it I think  But then there’s 
different types like understanding of graphs and equality and that sort of thing”  
Robyn and Tracey frequently stressed the need for lots of experience with concrete 
materials before children can learn the abstract ideas  I challenged this idea when talking to 
Tracey: 
 
Interviewer: Jamie-Lee talked about infinity this morning  That’s a really abstract idea   
Tracey: Yes, but a lot of them know it  
Interviewer: What do you think they know about it? 
Tracey: Just the idea of numbers going on forever and ever   
Interviewer: So you know how you said that they couldn’t understand any abstract ideas without 
concrete experiences … 
Tracey: Well, usually, I mean  I am thinking more about maths ideas when I say that  
Interviewer: Do you see abstract understanding as being quite different from concrete 
understanding  Or are they just understandings about two different things   
Tracey: No, different types  They can have one or the other, or both  Say it’s measurement  
They can understand how to measure centimetres, concrete, or what centimetres are as 
abstract but that is harder  But if it is infinity like with Jamie-Lee that is all abstract, 
isn’t it? 
Interviewer: Yes, it’s a very important abstract idea  Are there other sorts of understanding— other 
type besides concrete and abstract? 
Tracey: Possibly  What are they? 
 
The teachers’ responses to my question about types of understanding were not 
unexpected  Discussions about possible types of understanding are not common in teacher 
education courses let alone articles that teachers read  It is interesting, though, that these 
results conflicted markedly with academics’ responses during a pilot study for the research 
project  When the first question above was asked of 11 mathematics education lecturers, 
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It was clear that the academics had a wide field of ideas to draw from in their 
reflection, discussion, and writing about mathematical understanding  All four teachers’ 
lessons demonstrated opportunities for children to develop many of these forms of 
understanding, so perhaps their not being to articulate different forms is not important to 
their effectiveness as mathematics teachers  It was surprising, though—given that the term 
is used often in advice to mathematics teachers and trainees—that these teachers could not 
describe a range of types of understanding that children might exhibit   
Again, the teachers’ focus was on what is to be understood (e g , infinity) rather than 
different types of understanding that they could aim to develop  
Conclusion 
One cannot generalise from four teachers to mathematics teachers in general, but this 
component of the case study research suggests a need for further exploration  Many 
research questions could be identified; e g , Is the spiral model very common across 
Victorian schools, and if so is it related to years of working with curriculum documents 
that present content in a particular mode? Most importantly, if the model is widespread, 
what effects does it seem to have on teachers’ planning and expectations? If the metaphor 
is one that is held fairly commonly, does this change as the Victorian Curriculum and 
Assessment Authority’s new framework of “essential learning” is introduced to all 
Victorian schools? Has a focus on the “new basics” in Queensland schools led to a 
comparatively wider variety of models of mathematical understanding in teachers’ minds, 
and perhaps less structural ones? 
In relation to forms of knowledge, we need to question whether, given that 
mathematical understanding is thought to be a key to children’s success in our discipline, is 
it important that teacher educators stimulate their students to explore different meanings 
for this term  Whether and how other models held by experienced teachers impact on their 
practices of planning, teaching and evaluating mathematics lessons would also be worthy 
of further study  
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